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ARBITRATION OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT DISPUTES:
ENCOURAGING THE USE OF ARBITRATION
THROUGH EVIDENCE RULES REFORM
GREGG A. PARADISE
INTRODUCriON
Patent infringement litigation is becoming increasingly prevalent in
today's high-technology society. New computer and electronic de-
vices are gradually dominating more aspects of life. There is increas-
ing competition among manufacturers for the exclusive rights to build
and market these new inventions.' Along with this competition comes
a predictable flurry of patent infringement disputes which have led
many parties to court.2
Standard litigation in the federal court system, however, is ill-
equipped to handle the complex issues presented in patent infringe-
ment cases.3 Patent infringement claims usually require comprehen-
sion of complex inventions, related prior art, and alleged infringing
devices. The testimony given by experts in the technology is often
conflicting. Judges and jury members who lack technical expertise
often are overwhelmed and confused by such material and lack the
1. See Owen Edwards, Technology Meets the Toady, Forbes, Dec. 7, 1992, at 130
(highlighting increasing competition in the software industry); James C. Cooper &
Kathleen Madigan, Business Outlook: The Economy Must Keep its Speed Down to
Swerve Away From Inflation, Bus. Wk., May 8, 1989, at 31 (noting world-wide increas-
ing competition in the manufacturing sector).
Exclusive rights to make, use, and sell inventions are granted through the patent
laws of the United States which are promulgated in Title 35 of the United States
Code. For purposes of this Note, "inventions" shall include processes, machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter as they are defined in Title 35. 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994). See infra part L.A for a detailed discussion of United States patent laws.
2. This Note will focus its attention on disputes related to patents. Most of the
issues discussed in this Note, however, are equally applicable to disputes involving
other forms of intellectual property such as trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets.
See, e.g., Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1199
(7th Cir. 1987) ("[Flederal law does not forbid arbitration of the validity of a copy-
right .... ."); 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
tion § 32.56, at 32-257 (3d ed. 1992) ("[It appears that there are no legal barriers to
arbitration of trademark disputes.. . ."); Center for Public Resources, Inc., ADR in
Technology Disputes 7 (1987) (stating that trade secret controversies have gone to
ADR).
3. The federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement
disputes under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). See generally Donald Shelby Chisum, The
Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46
Wash. L. Rev. 633, 644-50 (1971) (discussing the breadth of federal court jurisdiction
over patent cases).
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background to resolve the conflicting assertions.4 This confusion can
lead to lengthy trials and improper judgments.5
The United States court system is not designed for accurate, effi-
cient resolution of major disputes such as patent infringement cases.
Indeed, former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger stated:
[Primary reliance on the adversarial process as a means of resolv-
ing disputes is] a mistake that must be corrected .... For some dis-
putes, trials will be the only means, but for many claims, trials by
the adversarial contest must in time go the way of the ancient trial
by battle and blood. Our system is too costly, too painful, too de-
structive, [and] too inefficient for a truly civilized people.6
Arbitration of patent infringement disputes in many instances, how-
ever, overcomes the deficiencies of court litigation. The features of
arbitration that can lead to its superiority over litigation include: rela-
tive speed and economy, privacy, convenience, informality, reduced
likelihood of damage to ongoing business relationships, simpler proce-
dural and evidentiary rules, and the ability to select arbitrators who
are experts and are familiar with the subject matter of the dispute.7
Further, the entire nature of arbitration is flexible and may be
adapted to the needs of the parties.8
Although arbitration is superior to litigation for the resolution of
many patent disputes, most patent attorneys and their clients still
avoid arbitration.9 One of the obstacles to widespread use of arbitra-
4. See Tom Arnold, Fundamentals of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why Prefer
ADR, in Patent Litigation 1993, at 655, 661 (Practising L. Inst.: Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook [hereinafter PLI/Pat] Series
No. 376, 1993).
5. See id. at 660-61.
6. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Mid-Year Meeting of ABA, 52 U.S.L.W. 2471,
2471 (Feb. 28, 1984).
7. See H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 776-77 (citing Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del.
1930) and Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971)); Tom Arnold et al., Patent Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution Handbook § 5 (1991). The Patent Alternative Dispute Resolution
Handbook is the leading book entirely devoted to the resolution of patent disputes
through alternative dispute resolution including binding arbitration. This Note will
therefore make frequent reference to this book and Tom Arnold's related articles. See
Arnold, supra note 4.
The advantages of arbitration over litigation are addressed fully infra part II.C.
The American Bar Association's Section on Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law
has endorsed the use of arbitration for resolving disputes involving patent validity and
infringement. H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777.
8. See Bruce B. Brunda, Resolution of Patent Disputes By Non-Litigation Proce-
dures, 15 AIPLA QJ. 73, 82-83 (1987). See generally James N. Dresser, Agreements to
Arbitrate Patent Disputes, 67 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 551 (1985) (reviewing
several provisions parties may include in an arbitration agreement).
9. PTC Research Foundation, Alternatives to Court Litigation in Intellectual
Property Disputes: Binding Arbitration and/or Mediation-Patent and Nonpatent Is-
sues, 22 IDEA - J.L. & Tech. 271, 275 (1981).
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tion in patent disputes is the lack of conformity to rules of evidence.10
Although the absence of rules of evidence in some respects is an ad-
vantage of arbitration,"' it also leads to several major deficiencies.
Without rules of evidence, patent arbitrations often become a "battle
of experts," destroying the cost add efficiency advantages arbitration
holds over litigation. 2 Additionally, although arbitrators usually have
a scientific background, they may improperly consider unreliable and
irresponsible evidence such as affidavits that have not been cross-ex-
amined and the testimony of "junk scientists." 13
This Note examines the use of binding arbitration in patent in-
fringement disputes and advocates the adoption of a modified version
of the Federal Rules of Evidence for use in patent arbitrations. The
Federal Rules of Evidence should be the standard by which arbitra-
tors decide whether to admit testimony, and judge the credibility and
qualifications of "expert" witnesses. Certain allowances must be
made in the rules, however, to retain the advantages of arbitration.14
Part I of this Note discusses patent infringement litigation in the fed-
eral court system, including the requirements of patent infringement
litigation, the current state of such litigation in the federal courts, and
the problems associated with litigation of this type. Part II focuses on
the arbitration of patent disputes. This part describes the availability
of patent arbitration, its characteristics, and its advantages over litiga-
tion. Part III outlines the problems associated with the absence of
rules of evidence in patent arbitration proceedings. Part IV proposes
the use of a modified version of the Federal Rules of Evidence in pat-
ent arbitrations. The proposed changes include permitting the admis-
sion of experts' reports and certain forms of hearsay evidence that are
beneficial to the efficient resolution of patent infringement disputes.
In order to implement these changes involving use of a modified ver-
sion of the Federal Rules of Evidence, this Note advocates the use of
three-member arbitration panels, of which at least one arbitrator is
skilled in applying rules of evidence, or requiring all arbitrators to
possess a basic understanding of the application of rules of evidence.
This Note concludes that such changes are necessary to encourage
participants in patent infringement disputes to take advantage of the
benefits of arbitration.
10. See American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), Patent Arbitration Rules,
Rule 30, at 14 (1993) [hereinafter Patent Arbitration Rules] ("[Clonformity to legal
rules of evidence shall not be necessary.").
11. See discussion infra part Im.A.
12. See David W. Plant, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in Patent Litigation 1988,
at 197, 239 (PLI/Pat Series No. 258, 1988); see discussion infra part III.A.
13. See Tom Arnold, Setting Up the Arbitration, in Patent Litigation 1993, at 703,
707 (PLIIPat Series No. 376, 1993); see discussion infra part M.A.
14. See discussion infra part IV.
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I. DEFICIENCIES OF PATENT LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
The current system of litigating most patent infringement disputes
in the federal district courts is riddled with problems. Some of these
deficiencies stem from the complex nature of the patent laws them-
selves. Many of the troubles, however, are attributable to the nature
of litigation, the motives of the parties involved, and the inability of
the federal district courts to adjudicate patent infringement disputes
efficiently and effectively.
A. The United States Patent System
Article I of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.' 15 Congress exercised this right by
establishing the Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO"), and by granting
exclusive rights, for seventeen years, to "[w]hoever invents or discov-
ers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof ... ." 6 These
patents grant a virtual monopoly over the invention to the inventor
and thus are quite valuable. 7
The class of inventions and processes that are eligible for patent
protection is quite narrow. To obtain a patent, the invention must be
(1) of patentable subject matter,'8 (2) useful,19 (3) novel,20 and (4)
non-obvious. 2' Further, the applicant for the patent must (1) be the
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (1994).
17. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8
Res. in L. & Econ. 31, 33 (1986) (discussing the great value of patents and questioning
whether such an exclusive grant is necessary to encourage creative invention).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). For an invention to be of patentable subject matter it
must fall within one of the classes defined by § 101. Specifically, patents are available
for "any ... process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or ... any
improvement thereof." Id. A "process" is further defined as any "process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composi-
tion of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 101. "For a product or process to be useful it must, at the very
least, work, although it does not have to work perfectly or even better than any com-
peting products or processes that might exist." Herbert F. Schwartz, Patent Law and
Practice 45 (Federal Judicial Center 1990) (footnotes omitted).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). An invention is "novel" if no identical invention
exists in the "prior art" as defined by the law. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 46.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). An invention is "non-obvious" if it is not merely a
simple extension of existing "prior art" which would be "obvious at the time the in-
vention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains." Id.; see Schwartz, supra note 19, at 51.
[Vol. 64
PATENT ARBITRATION
original inventor,' (2) avoid the statutory time bars, (3) adequately
disclose the invention,24 and (4) distinctly claim the invention. z
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), "whoever without authority makes, uses
or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."2' When someone is
accused of infringing a patent there are four general issues that must
be resolved. 7 These issues are: whether or not the patent is valid,
whether or not the patent is enforceable, whether or not the patent
has been infringed, and to what relief, if any, either the patentee or
the accused infringer is entitled.' Typically, all of these issues are re-
solved at trial in the federal courts.29
B. Problems Associated with Patent Litigation in the Federal Courts
The federal court system, generally, is inefficient at resolving com-
plex disputes. ° The nature of patent infringement disputes exacer-
bates these inefficiencies.3 Thus, patent disputes are particularly
plagued by the shortcomings of adversarial litigation.
1. Time
Patent owners can exercise their exclusive rights to make, use, or
sell their inventions for seventeen years from the date the patent is
granted.32 Patents, therefore, as "wasting assets," steadily decrease in
value.3 3 The average patent case takes more than five years to be de-
cided in the courts.34 Some cases have even lasted for more than
twenty years; longer than the life of the patent in question. 5
Perhaps even more important than the length of time a typical pat-
ent infringement case takes to wind its way through the courts, is the
complete lack of predictability as to how long the process will take.'
Businesses have an essential need to know when a dispute will be de-
cided. They need to be able to answer questions such as whether to
22. 35 U.S.C. § 102(0 (1994).
23. Id. § 102(b), (d) (1994).
24. Id. § 112 para. 1 (1994).
25. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 64.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
27. See Plant, supra note 12, at 227.
28. Id.
29. See supra note 3.
30. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994). Design patents issued for "any new, original and orna-
mental design for an article of manufacture," 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994), are granted only
for a term of 14 years. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994).
33. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 658.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 659.
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build a new production facility,37 or whether to continue producing
the allegedly infringing product and risk paying enormous damages.38
By the time the case is resolved in the courts, the answers to these
questions may be moot.
Several factors contribute to these time delays. The first is the very
nature of patent infringement suits. These cases involve complex
technical information that require significant time for a judge or jury
to comprehend fully. More blame usually lies, however, with the com-
peting adversaries. One or both of the parties typically will extend the
length of the proceedings through numerous deposition requests, mul-
titudes of motions, and several levels of appeals.39 One party often
may keep the matter from final resolution for many years.
Even when both parties do not indulge in delay tactics and are
ready to litigate, the doors of the federal district courthouse are often
difficult to pass through. Currently, the federal district courts' civil
dockets are very overcrowded.' The number of civil cases alone has
increased almost sevenfold since 1938.41 An even greater burden on
the court dockets are criminal cases subject to the Speedy Trial Act of
1974.42 Courts do not have the time to hear lengthy patent cases
37. See Kevin R. Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 Fed. Cir-
cuit BJ. 1, 5 (1993); Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.03.
38. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.03; Arnold, supra note 4, at 659. The issue of
speed is perhaps of greatest importance in the computer industry, especially with re-
gard to software protection suits. The rate of change of the technology in this area is
so fast that waiting two or three years for a decision could render the result moot. See
David Bender, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Computer-Related Dispute: An
Ideal Marriage?, 7 Computer Law., May 1990, at 9, 12 & n.13; Karl P. Kilb, Arbitra-
tion of Patent Disputes: An Important Option in the Age of Information Technology, 4
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ. 599, 611 & n.66 (1993) (citing Management
Sys. Assocs. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 762 F.2d 1161 (4th Cir. 1985)).
James F. Henry, President of the Center for Public Resources, stated, "[iun an era
when product lives are measured in months and litigation is measured in decades, you
can't afford litigation." Controlling Litigation Costs with a Neutral Third Party, N.Y.
Tunes, Sept. 23, 1990, § 3, at 6.
39. A party who feels they have an economic or temporal advantage over its ad-
versary may often use these tactics and can better afford to extend indefinitely the
length of the trial. See Brunda, supra note 8, at 76-77.
This problem of delay is not unique to patent litigation. It is often encountered in
virtually all types of litigation. The problem of delay is especially troubling with re-
spect to patent litigation, however, because of the "wasting" nature of patent rights.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. Casey, supra note 37, at 4.
41. Arnold, supra note 7, § 1.02 (citing Dayton, The Myth of Alternate Dispute
Resolution in the Federal Courts 2 (1990)).
42. The Speedy Trial Act Amendments Act of 1979, Pub.L. No. 96-43, 93 Stat. 327(1979) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). One provision of this Act re-
quires that a defendant be brought to trial within 70 days after the filing of an indict-
ment or information. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(2) (1988). Thus, district courts must hear
these cases in a timely manner and often must delay hearing other civil cases.
[Vol. 64
PATENT ARBITRATION
which typically take several weeks to litigate.43 Thus, patent cases
often lie dormant for many months or years. 4
2. Cost
All litigation is expensive. Patent litigation, however, is particularly
costly. Most patent cases cost $500,000 at a minimum to litigate, and
average over one million dollars in costs per pary 4 5 Frequently,
cases will cost between two and five million dollars In one recent
case, Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,47 the parties spent almost
$200,000,000 combined.4 In another case, Judge Malcolm J. Howard
of the Eastern District of North Carolina postulated that it cost over
$100,000 a day for Burroughs Wellcome Co. to defend its patent on
the drug azidothymidine (commonly known as "AZT").49 That esti-
mate did not include the costs of the court and jury.5°
Often, the largest component of these exorbitant litigation costs is
attributable to discovery.I Almost eighty percent of all legal fees are
incurred during discovery.' Zealous attorneys, fighting for large
stakes for their clients, often seek "[e]xcessive, lengthy, and costly dis-
43. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 1.02. In 1969-70, for example, patent cases com-
prised more than 20% of all civil cases requiring more than 20 days to fully litigate.
Kilb, supra note 38, at 602. In that same time period, patent cases only accounted for
one to two percent of the total number of civil cases filed each year in the district
courts. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of I. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 336 &
n.29 (1971).
44. In fact some believe that "[t]echnology disputes are among those which may
have to wait in line at the courthouse doors. According to Robert Raven, immediate
past president of the American Bar Association, access to the civil side of most metro-
politan area federal courts could be closed within two years." American Bar Associa-
tion, Technology-Based Dispute Resolution: Court Crisis a Factor in ADR Choice, 26
ABA Info. Update Dispute Resol. 2 (Spring/Summer 1990) (emphasis added).
45. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 662 (noting that patent cases routinely cost over
one million dollars per party); Casey, supra note 37, at 4 (noting that patent cases
typically cost at least half a million dollars to litigate) (citing American Intellectual
Property Law Association, Report of Economic Survey 1991, Table 37, at 28-29
(1991)); David W. Platt, ADR and Patents, in Patent Litigation 1992, at 797, 798 (PLI/
Pat Series No. 350, 1992) (stating that the cost to prepare for trial can easily exceed
one million dollars).
46. Arnold, supra note 4, at 662; see Platt, supra note 45, at 798.
47. 641 F. Supp. 828 (D. Mass.) (enjoining Kodak), aff'd, 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. Mass. 1990) (awarding damages); Polaroid Corp. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711 (BNA) (D. Mass. 1991) (amending prior damage
award to correct clerical errors in original calculation).
48. Casey, supra note 37, at 4 n.13.
49. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., 828 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (E.D.N.C.
1993), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
50. Id
51. See Casey, supra note 37, at 1; see also Kenneth B. Clark and William A. Fen-
wick, Structuring an Arbitration Agreement for High Technology Disputes, 9 Com-
puter Law. 22, 24 (1992) ("Pretrial discovery is often the largest component of
litigation cost."). This problem of discovery costs is familiar to all types of litigations.
52. Michele Galen, Guilty!, Bus. Wk., Apr. 13, 1992, at 60, 64.
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covery."53 Costs for discovery can accumulate at an alarming rate.
Discovery has been compared to peeling an onion because "[e]ach
layer exposes another layer of problems that you must explore. '5 4 For
each of these layers, which may take anywhere from a day to a week
to sift through, one or more lawyers for each side must be present.5
In certain cases, these exorbitant costs can be justified;56 in many
cases, however, these expenses are not warranted.
3. Quality of Judgments
The quality and fairness of court judgments in patent infringement
cases is quite suspect.5 7 The outcomes of jury trials are largely unpre-
dictable.58 One commentator has characterized the jury system in the
following manner: "When the experts disagree, we submit the ques-
tion to six to twelve jurors completely ignorant of the subject matter
both technically and legally" and expect them to produce justice and
equity.59 While this problem is present in all jury trials, it is particu-
larly problematic with respect to patent infringement cases due to
their highly technical nature.
Unfortunately, bench trials are not necessarily more reliable. Pat-
ent disputes are very complicated "because they involve difficult va-
lidity, enforceability, infringement, and damages issues."60 Most
judges do not have technical expertise or experience with patent law.6'
They are neither scientists nor engineers and typically spend between
0.01% and 2.0% of their total court time dealing with patent
litigations.62
In General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chem. Co.,63 Judge
Friendly stated: "This patent appeal is another illustration of the ab-
surdity of requiring the decision of such cases to be made by judges
53. Casey, supra note 37, at 1. This aspect is particularly troublesome because, to
a large extent, a party's litigation costs are controlled by the judge and opposing coun-
sel. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 664 ("[T]hirty percent of the cost [of litigation] is in
the control of the judge [and] [t]hirty percent of the cost is in the control of adverse
counsel.").
54. Roger S. Borovoy, Alternative Means of Resolving High Technology Disputes,
in Patent Antitrust 1989, at 539, 540 (PLI/Pat Series No. 270, 1989).
55. Id. The cost to the witness, often an employee of one of the parties to the suit,
for several days of lost work must not be forgotten either.
56. Polaroid recovered $873,158,971 from Kodak. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1714 (D. Mass. 1991).
57. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 664.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Casey, supra note 37, at 1; see also Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593-
94 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Such issues [as patent scope and validity] involve complex and
difficult questions in applying an extremely technical body of law.").
61. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.02. Arnold cites others problems with judges, in
general, such as incompetence and "stupidity." Arnold, supra note 4, at 665-66.
62. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.02.
63. 497 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974).
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whose knowledge of the relevant technology derives primarily, or
even solely, from explanations by counsel and who.., do not have
access to a scientifically knowledgeable staff."' The district court
judges in many cases simply do not have the experience or the re-
sources to try these cases efficiently and justly.65
II. ARBrrRATION OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT DIsPUTES
Because of the inadequacies of resolving patent infringement dis-
putes through litigation in the federal courts, a better method must be
found and utilized. This new method must rid itself of the time, cost,
and quality deficiencies of litigation. In many cases, arbitration can
provide this remedy.
A. Congressional Authorization of Arbitration for the Resolution of
Patent Infringement Disputes
Prior to 1982, patent infringement disputes could not be settled pri-
vately through arbitration. 66 Courts regularly held that agreements
reached through arbitration were unenforceable because they were
against the "public interest."'67 Courts also contended that arbitrators
were not qualified to resolve patent cases because they were too
complex.68
64. IL at 1284.
65. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). See generally Blonder-Tongue
Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 (1971) ("[P]atent litigation can present
issues so complex that legal minds without appropriate grounding in science and tech-
nology, may have difficulty in reaching decision."); Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp., 342
F.2d 531, 532 (1st Cir. 1965) ("The court below in recognition of its avowed limitation
rested its decision basically on its evaluation of the relative credibility of opposing
expert witnesses."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 847 (1966); Harries v. Air King Prods. Co.,
183 F.2d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 1950) ("Congress sees fit to set before us tasks which are so
much beyond our powers... that we shall resort to the testimony of experts .. .
66. See Casey, supra note 37, at 2-3.
67. See, e.g. Beckman Instruments v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th
Cir. 1970) ("[Patent validity] questions are inappropriate for arbitration proceedings
and should be decided by a court of law, given the great public interest in challenging
invalid patents."), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 440 F. Supp. 897, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Dienatic Mfg. Corp. v. Packag-
ing Indus., 381 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Homewood Indus. v. Caldwell, 360 F.
Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D. MI1. 1973), aff'd, 566 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1977). The Supreme
Court recognized a similar public interest in challenging invalid patents in Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (recognizing "the important public interest in
permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of
the public domain").
68. See e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585,593-94 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Such
issues [in a patent dispute] involve complex and difficult questions in applying an
extremely technical body of law. They are questions that may be unfamiliar to arbi-
trators. .. ").
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The number of patent cases filed each year has increased along with
the scope of patentable subject matter.69 Early 1980s Supreme Court
decisions extended patent protection to live, human-made microorga-
nisms,70 and to processes including digital computer programs.71 This
increased caseload exacerbated existing deficiencies in the litigation of
patent infringement disputes,72 and caused Congress to reexamine the
ban on arbitration of such disputes.73
This reexamination led Congress to enact Public Law 97-247, which
provides for voluntary arbitration of patent infringement disputes.74
69. See Kilb, supra note 38, at 603-04.
70. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
71. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
72. See discussion supra part I.B.
73. The House Report accompanying the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1924, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1988)),
states:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law.
Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their
own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate
upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction.
This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly
embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the Amer-
ican courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to
be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently
criticised the rule and recognized the illogical nature and the injustice which
results from it.
H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
74. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 17(b)(1), 96 Stat. 317, 322 (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1988)). See H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
12-13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 776-77.
Section 294 became effective on February 27, 1983 and provides:
(a) A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain
a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or
infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a provision,
the parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree
in writing to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agree-
ment shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any grounds
that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract.
(b) Arbitration of such disputes, awards by arbitrators and confirmation of
awards shall be governed by title 9, United States Code, to the extent such
title is not inconsistent with this section. In any such arbitration proceeding,
the defenses provided for under section 282 of [title 35] shall be considered
by the arbitrator if raised by any party to the proceeding.
(c) An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the par-
ties to the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person.
The parties to an arbitration may agree that in the event a patent which is
the subject matter of an award is subsequently determined to be invalid or
unenforceable in a judgment rendered by a court [of] competent jurisdiction
from which no appeal can or has been taken, such award may be modified by
any court of competent jurisdiction upon application by any party to the
arbitration. Any such modification shall govern the rights and obligations
between such parties from the date of such modification.
(d) When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee or
licensee shall give notice thereof in writing to the Commissioner. There shall
PATENT ARBITRATION
The House Judiciary Committee stated that this statutory authoriza-
tion of patent arbitration would "benefit both the parties to these dis-
putes and the public."75 The Judiciary Committee noted the many
benefits that arbitration provides for the parties,76 as well as two ways
that arbitration serves the public?7 According to the Committee, the
public will benefit from arbitration because it "will enhance the patent
system and thus will encourage innovation," and "could relieve some
of the burdens on the overworked Federal courts."'78
Two years later, the Patent Law Amendments Act of 198479 added
subsection (d) to § 135 of Title 35, expanding the scope of arbitration
to patent interferences in the PTO.80 Finally, the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 198481 enacted a prohibition against certain litiga-
tions of chip-product rights unless an attempt is first made to resolve
the dispute through voluntary negotiation, mediation, or binding arbi-
tration.81 Section 294 generally allows for the arbitration of patent
infringement disputes.8 3 TWo avenues to arbitration are provided:
be a separate notice prepared for each patent involved in such proceeding.
Such notice shall set forth the names and addresses of the parties, the name
of the inventor, and the name of the patent owner, shall designate the
number of the patent, and shall contain a copy of the award. If an award is
modified by a court, the party requesting such modification shall give notice
of such modification to the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall, upon
receipt of either notice, enter the same in the record of the prosecution of
such patent. If the required notice is not filed with the Commissioner, any
party to the proceeding may provide such notice to the Commissioner.
(e) The award shall be unenforceable until the notice required by subsec-
tion (d) is received by the Commissioner.
35 U.S.C. § 294 (1994).
75. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, PLR Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), re-
printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777.
76. Id. These benefits, which will be discussed in detail infra part 1I.C, include
relative speed and economy, privacy, convenience, informality, reduced likelihood of
damage to ongoing business relationships, simpler procedural and evidentiary rules,
and the ability to select arbitrators who are experts and familiar with the subject mat-
ter of the dispute.
77. H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777.
78. Id.; see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
79. Pub. L. No. 98-622 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 294(d) (1994)).
80. An "interference" is declared when two or more patent applications pending
in the PTO at the same time, or when a pending patent application and an already
issued patent, claim the same subject matter. 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (1994).
81. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-620 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 907 (1994)).
82. ld. This Note is primarily concerned only with the implications and require-
ments of 35 U.S.C. § 294.
It should also be noted that the 1994 amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930 provide
that the United States International Trade Commission may terminate any investiga-
tion when the parties to the dispute agree to submit the matter to arbitration. 19
U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1994).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (1988).
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preexisting agreements to arbitrate under contract, 84 and agreements
in writing to settle existing disputes by arbitration.85 Title IX of the
United States Code governs patent arbitrations conducted pursuant to
§ 294.86 Under Title IX, a district court may stay court proceedings to
allow the parties to resolve the dispute by arbitration.87 A district
court also has the power to enforce a contract provision requiring the
parties to arbitrate their dispute. 88
Once an arbitration award is rendered, it is final and binding upon
the parties,89 subject to a limited number of exceptions providing for
vacation or modification of the award.90 Under no circumstances,
however, may a court review the substantive findings of an arbitra-
tor.91 An arbitration award may only be vacated if: "[it] was procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means,"' "there was evident partiality
84. An arbitration clause may, thus, be included in any patent contract such as a
patent license agreement. The American Arbitration Association recommends that
the following standard patent arbitration clause be used:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American
Arbitration Association under its Patent Arbitration Rules and judgment on
the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court having
jurisdiction thereof.
AAA, Introduction to Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10, at 4 (1993).
The Supreme Court has stated that any ambiguities concerning the effects of arbi-
tration clauses and issues able to be included, should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (1994). The AAA also provides a contract term for the
submission of existing patent disputes to arbitration. AAA, Introduction to Patent
Arbitration Rules, supra note 10, at 4.
86. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1988); see also 35 U.S.C. § 294(b) (1994).
87. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
88. Id. § 4.
89. Patent arbitration awards are not binding on anyone other than the parties to
the particular dispute. 35 U.S.C. § 294(c) (1994) (stating that an arbitration award
"shall have no force or effect on any other person" besides the parties to the dispute).
Patent arbitration awards are unenforceable until reported, in writing, to the Com-
missioner of Patents in the PTO. 35 U.S.C. § 294(d)-(e) (1994).
90. 35 U.S.C. § 294(c) (1988). Vacation and modification of arbitration awards are
controlled by 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) respectively.
91. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,
149 (1968) ("[Arbitrators] have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the
facts and are not subject to appellate review.").
92. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993); see, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 1988) (vacating arbitration award because of
perjury of expert witness for investors). Courts generally apply a three-part test to
determine if an arbitration award should be vacated because of corruption, fraud or
undue means. Under this test a movant must: (1) present clear and convincing evi-
dence that the fraud occurred, (2) show that the fraud could not have been discovered
prior to or during the arbitration through the exercise of due diligence, (3) show that
the fraud was materially related to an arbitration issue. Id. at 1383; LaFarge Conseils
et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir.
1986).
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or corruption in the arbitrators, 93 there was other arbitrator miscon-
duct,94 "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, '95 antitrust concerns
existed,96 or other public policy concerns existed.97
The standard to be employed by courts in determining whether to
vacate an arbitration award is one of "manifest disregard."98 This
standard is "' "something beyond and different from a mere error in
the law ....."' [M]anifest disregard will be found where an 'arbitrator
"understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore
t, , ,99
B. An Overview of Patent Arbitration Disputes
While the availability, enforceability, modification, and vacation of
arbitrations are governed by statute, the rules of the arbitration hear-
ing are governed almost entirely by the parties' contract to arbitrate.
These contracts may be extremely detailed and cover all of the rules
of the arbitration, or they may simply designate that the arbitration
will be covered by an established set of rules such as the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") Patent Arbitration Rules.100
93. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993); see Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d
171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating the standards by which arbitrators will be disquali-
fied for evident partiality, and ratifying the resignation of a panel of arbitrators who
felt they could not be impartial). The Second Circuit noted that evident partiality
means more than a mere appearance of bias. International Produce, Inc. v. A/S
Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 551-52 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). This is a
higher standard than that applied to disqualifying judges. Id. at 551. Courts will sel-
dom question the decision of an arbitrator to recuse herself; "[t]hat decision is better
left to the discretion of the individual arbitrator." Florasynth, 750 F.2d at 174 (citing
Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1968)).
94. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993). The statute defines sufficient misconduct
as refusing to postpone a hearing without just cause, refusing to hear pertinent and
material evidence, or other misbehavior which may prejudice the rights of a party. Id.
95. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (Supp. V 1993); see Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton
Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (arbitrators exceeded their authority by award-
ing punitive damages because parties chose New York law which prohibits arbitrators
from awarding punitive damages).
96. See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47-50 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that antitrust
claims are generally not subject to arbitration).
97. See e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43
(1987) (holding that a court may vacate an arbitration award because enforcement of
it "would violate 'some explicit public policy' that is 'well defined and dominant, and
is to be ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from gen-
eral considerations of supposed public interests" '") (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1982) (citations omitted)).
98. See Falmestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512,516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 942 (1991).
99. Id. (quoting Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1985))
(citations omitted).
100. See supra note 10. A suggested patent arbitration clause is noted supra note
84.
While this Note will often reference the AAA Patent Arbitration Rules, the ideas
contained herein apply equally to arbitrations governed by private contracts. The
ideas expressed by this Note infra will encourage changes to the AAA Patent Arbitra-
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The AAA is the most well-known and utilized arbitration adminis-
trator. 01 In response to the addition of 35 U.S.C. § 294, the AAA in
1983 promulgated a uniform set of rules for use in arbitration of pat-
ent disputes."° The AAA Patent Arbitration Rules are important be-
cause, even when parties create their own arbitration agreement and
rules, the AAA Rules are the usual starting point from which they
work.10 3
The scope of the remedies available to arbitrators is quite broad.
The AAA Patent Arbitration Rules state that "[t]he arbitrator may
grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable
and within the scope of the agreement of the parties."'1 4 Thus, unless
specifically excluded, remedies such as injunctions and specific per-
formance are available. 10 5
A typical patent arbitration hearing begins with the patent owner
stating their case for infringement. 0 6 This claim is usually followed by
rebuttal and reply periods. 10 7 During the hearing, a party may typi-
cally raise any defense available under 35 U.S.C. § 282.1s The arbi-
tration usually proceeds through a "question and answer" period,
during which participation by the arbitrator is common. 10 9 Arguments
for invalidity and unenforceability of the patent and arguments that
the accused product does not infringe the patent are then presented
by the accused infringer. 10 This is followed by similar rebuttals and
replies."' After the hearing, the arbitrator considers the evidence
and, usually within a short period of time, reaches a decision and in-
tion Rules and recommend that these changes be adopted by all parties to patent
arbitrations whether they utilize the AAA's rules or their own.
101. Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.02[1]. In 1990 alone, the AAA administered over
60,000 cases involving claims of over $2.5 billion. Ia&
102. See Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10.
103. Cf. Casey, supra note 37, at 8-9 ("A growing number of intellectual property
disputes are arbitrated each year under the auspices of the AAA."). See generally
Ronald E. Myrick & Penelope Smith Wilson, Licensing Rights to Software, in Tech-
nology Licensing and Litigation 1993, at 467, § 1022.2 (PLI/Pat Series No. 354, 1993)
(suggesting use of AAA Patent Arbitration Rules); Kilb, supra note 38, at 607-08
(noting possible use of AAA rules).
104. Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10, Rule 42, at 16.
105. Id.
106. Brunda, supra note 8, at 82. It is important to note that the structure of the
hearing, as with any other characteristic or rule of an arbitration, is entirely subject to
change by the parties or by the arbitrator under the powers granted in the arbitration
agreement.
107. 1I
108. 35 U.S.C. § 294(b) (1994); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (stating the various
defenses).
109. Brunda, supra note 8, at 82. Patent arbitration panels typically consist of one
or three arbitrators depending on the wishes of the parties involved. Cf. Patent Arbi-
tration Rules, supra note 10, Rule 16, at 11 (providing that the default number of
arbitrators shall be one). Wherever this Note makes reference to a single arbitrator it
should be interpreted as either an arbitrator or arbitrators.
110. Brunda, supra note 8, at 82.
111. Id.
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forms the parties of such decision." 2 The parties then notify the Com-
missioner of Patents of the award and it becomes fully binding.113
C. The Advantages of Arbitration of Patent Disputes over Litigation
The use of arbitration is not a complete panacea for the ills of pat-
ent infringement litigation. In many disputes the use of arbitration is
less desirable than litigation or even inappropriate." 4 There are a
vast number of patent disputes, however, that are prime candidates
for the numerous advantages and savings of arbitration. The follow-
ing is a discussion of these superior features of arbitration.
1. Cost
When President Ronald Reagan signed the patent arbitration
bill,"' he stated that one of the chief reasons for allowing arbitration
of patent disputes was "the inordinately high cost of patent litiga-
tion.""16 The cost of arbitrating a patent dispute usually is less than
eighty-five percent of the cost of litigating the same dispute.117 With
good case management and an experienced arbitrator, the costs
should fall to less than half of those incurred in litigation." 8
These savings can be attributed to several factors. One factor is that
transcripts of the proceedings usually are not required and the possi-
bility of appeal is severely curtailed."' The largest savings, though,
come from the ability to eliminate "blunderbuss discovery requests
and to avoid discovery disputes."' 20 For example, a clause in the arbi-
112. The amount of time the arbitrator may take to render a decision is often in-
cluded in the agreement to arbitrate to ensure speedy resolution of the dispute, which
is a principal advantage of arbitration over litigation. See infra part H.C.2.
113. See 35 U.S.C. § 294(d)-(e) (1988) ("The award shall be unenforceable until the
notice required by subsection (d) is received by the Commissioner.").
114. See infra part I.D.
115. See supra note 74.
116. Statement on Signing the Patent and Trademark Office Appropriations Bill,
1982 Pub. Papers 1087; see supra part I.B.2 (discussing the high costs of patent litiga-
tion in the federal courts).
117. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 657.
118. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.03. Some commentators question the extent of
cost savings offered by arbitration. They argue that there are costs special to arbitra-
tion, such as payment of the arbitrator, that can offset savings. Brunda, supra note 8,
at 82. Others have noted that attorneys involved in patent arbitration usually will put
in about the same amount of time as they would preparing for a trial. Bill Schuurman
& D.C. Toedt, III, Analyzing the New Dangers of Potential Patent Controversies: A
General Guide, 41 Bus. Law. 727, 742 (1986). Another cost related problem with
arbitration is that due to the accelerated nature of arbitration proceedings, the pay-
ment of costs associated with the arbitration are due sooner, which might be more
burdensome for some parties. Brunda, supra note 8, at 82. Overall, though, the evi-
dence indicates that parties to an arbitration should realize significant cost savings in
most disputes.
119. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.03.
120. Clark & Fenwick, supra note 51, at 25; see supra notes 51-56 and accompany-
ing text.
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tration agreement can regulate discovery.' 2 ' Moreover, many states
restrict or prohibit discovery in arbitrations," 2 and the discovery pro-
visions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not available in
arbitrations governed by Title IX.123 In either case, the arbitrator
must control the discovery process for these cost savings to be
realized.12 4
2. Time
Another advantage of arbitration in patent disputes is the dramatic
time savings. Some have noted that saving time is the "principal ad-
vantage" of arbitration.' 5 Arbitration of a patent dispute rarely ex-
ceeds twelve to fifteen months. 26 Often, with good case management
by the arbitrator, the entire dispute can be resolved in as little as six
months. 27 Further, it is much easier to predict when the dispute will
be finally resolved through arbitration than with litigation. 28 Predict-
ability is possible because parties can include a clause in the arbitra-
tion agreement requiring that a decision be rendered by the arbitrator
within a stated time period, often one year.'2 9
Arbitration is also free from many of the time-delaying processes
present in litigation, such as extended discovery and several levels of
appeal that can unpredictably extend litigation.130 Arbitrations are re-
solved more quickly than litigation because of their streamlined na-
ture. The limited discovery, for example, saves a significant amount of
121. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.15[2] n.132.
122. Clark & Fenwick, supra note 51, at 24; see, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1283
(West 1982) (restricting discovery in arbitrations). The AAA Patent Arbitration
Rules also place restrictions on discovery, vesting the arbitrator with the power to
eliminate most requests. See Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10, Rules 29, 31-33,
at 13-14. Thus, under the AAA Rules, parties do not have a quantified right to the
taking of any depositions. See Plant, supra note 12, at 234.
123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3); see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994); Foremost Yarn Mills, Inc.
v. Rose Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
124. See Roger M. Milgrim, Arbitration: An Important Remedial Technique to Re-
solve Disputes Related to Technology Licenses and to Corporate Ownership and Con-
trol, in Alternative Dispute Resolution and Risk Management: Controlling Conflict
and its Costs, at 59, § 4.5.2 (Practising Law Institute: Litigation and Administrative
Practice Course Handbook [hereinafter PLI/Lit] Series No. 338, 1987).
125. Schuurman & Toedt, supra note 118, at 742.
126. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 668.
127. 1&
128. See Casey, supra note 37, at 5; see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text
(discussing the importance of knowing when the dispute will be resolved).
129. See Tom Arnold & Robert J. McAughan, Jr., Alternate Dispute Resolution, in
Patent Litigation 1990, at 213, 232 (PLI/Pat Series No. 300, 1990); see also Arnold,
supra note 13, at 714 (suggesting that the arbitration contract could include a clause to
"reward the arbitrator with a bonus if he renders a decision within a particular time
period").
130. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
PATENT ARBITRATION
time,131 as well as money.'3  Resolution time also is decreased be-
cause most arbitrators are experts in the field relevant to the dis-
pute. 33 The arbitrator's "learning curve" is therefore much steeper
than that of an inexperienced judge or jury.131 Further, the arbitrator
can communicate with the parties and any expert witnesses in the lan-
guage of the field, thereby facilitating presentation of the issues and
testimony. 35
3. Quality of Judgments
Unlike judges and juries, arbitrators can be specifically sought out
for their expertise in the field of the dispute.1 3 6 For example, if the
dispute involves a company that has allegedly infringed a patent on a
pharmaceutical product, the arbitrator could be a chemical engineer
who has worked in the pharmaceutical industry. The AAA maintains
a National Panel of Patent Arbitrators to match parties to an arbitra-
tion with arbitrators "having experience in patent law and/or special
technical expertise" related to their dispute.1 37
Those arbitrators who are not experts in the particular field of the
dispute, usually have at least a general scientific background. The ar-
bitrator, therefore, has the ability to better understand the dispute and
more fairly resolve it'38-another prime advantage of arbitration. 39
4. Secrecy / Privacy
Additionally, all patent arbitration hearings are completely confi-
dential.' 40 Unlike court trials, there are no constitutional require-
ments for open arbitrations.' 4' Further, evidence, testimony, and
rulings from an arbitration may not be used in future proceedings. 42
This secrecy benefits corporations that do not want the facts of a case
to become public or want to protect the subject matter of the dispute
131. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
133. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.02 n.4; Casey, supra note 37, at 5; Bryan Niblett,
Intellectual Property Disputes: Arbitrating the Creative, Dispute Resolution J., Jan.
1995, at 64, 65.
134. Casey, supra note 37, at 5; see Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.02 nA.
135. Niblett, supra note 133, at 65.
136. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 669-70; Milgram, supra note 124, § 4.5.3; Patent
Arbitration Rules, supra note 10, Rules 12-13, at 9-10.
137. AAA, Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10, Rule 4, at 6.
138. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
139. Casey, supra note 37, at 5.
140. Brunda, supra note 8, at 83; Milgrim, supra note 124, § 4.5.4; Arnold, supra
note 7, § 5.05; see Hotels Condado Beach v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763
F.2d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 1985); AAA, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Dis-
putes Canon VI, at 10 (1994) (requiring an arbitrator to "be faithful to the relation-
ship of trust and confidentiality inherent in that office").
141. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.05.
142. Brunda, supra note 8, at 83.
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
from publication. 143 Some parties to an arbitration want to keep pri-
vate the "dirty linen" of a loss.'" Others have more specific, legiti-
mate concerns of protecting trade secrets, financial matters, or lists of
clients from their competitors. 45 With fast changing technology and
tight industry competition, public release of this information poten-
tially could be more damaging than the loss of the case. All of this
sensitive information is protected by the very nature of arbitration,
and impossible to protect in public litigation.'1 6
5. Preservation of Commercial Relationships
Another advantage of arbitration is that it is less adversarial than
litigation. The parties' business relationship, such as licensor/licensee,
seller/buyer, or employer/employee, is more likely to remain intact.147
One commentator characterizes arbitrations as "only half as adver-
sarial" as litigation. 148
One reason for this may be that, in litigation, very often one party
will try to extend and delay the proceedings as much as possible.14 9
Not only is this process more expensive for the other parties, but it
tends to infuriate them. These tactics are often perceived as unfair or
underhanded and the victim of such tactics is often reluctant to form
future business agreements with the adversary who subjected him to
them.
6. Flexibility
Finally, arbitration is completely flexible.'5 0 Most terms of arbitra-
tion may be modified by the parties. These adapted terms are en-
forced under contract law by the courts.' 51 Arbitration agreements
are interpreted "in accordance with the intentions of the parties as
therein expressed and in the light of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the negotiations for and execution of the agreement."'1 2
143. Casey, supra note 37, at 5; see Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.05.
144. Casey, supra note 37, at 5.
145. Niblett, supra note 133, at 65.
146. These benefits of secrecy and privacy in patent infringement arbitration are
equally beneficial in all other types of commercial arbitration.
147. Casey, supra note 37, at 6; see Niblett, supra note 133, at 65-66; Arnold, supra
note 7, § 5.06.
148. Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.06.
149. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
150. See H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777 (listing flexibility of arbitration as one of the advantages of
arbitration).
151. 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (1994) (stating that arbitration agreements "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for
revocation of a contract").
152. Local No. 725, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Standard Oil Co., 186 F.
Supp. 895, 899 (D.N.D. 1960); see also S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah
Int'l, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("An arbitration clause must be
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Flexibility allows the parties to choose those arbitration terms best
suited to resolving their particular dispute. Some parties may want to
specify that the dispute must be resolved within six months or a year,
while other parties may wish to provide for expanded discovery.1"3 In
this manner, the parties can best utilize all of the other advantages
provided by arbitration.
D. Possible Limitations on the Effectiveness of Patent Arbitration
Despite the inherent advantages of arbitration, some commentators
believe that patent arbitration will not be used very often. 54 For ex-
ample, only ten percent of patent attorneys responding to a survey
indicated that they would agree to arbitrate patent disputes on the
issue of validity involving claims of more than $1,000,000.155 Several
factors underlie this reluctance.
Many large companies have a general policy against arbitration be-
cause they perceive it as favoring smaller companies."m Others note,
however, that juries tend to favor smaller companies.15 Both of these
ideas are rooted in the belief that laypeople, as opposed to judges, will
usually side with an underdog they perceive is being persecuted by big
business. This argument does not transfer well from juries to arbitra-
tors, however. Patent arbitrators are generally experts in the field of
the dispute, and many have worked for large corporations in the
past.158 As such, they are not likely to share jurors' biases in favor of
smaller businesses. This argument, therefore, does not support resort
to litigation.
interpreted in accordance with the intention of the parties."), amended by, 579 F.
Supp. 1049 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 745 F.2d 190 (2d. Cir. 1984).
153. Other issues that parties may want to address in an arbitration agreement in-
dude: the law to govern the case; a severability clause to isolate only those issues ripe
for arbitration; selection of arbitrators; questions to be decided by the arbitrators;
selection of the locale for the arbitration; sequence of the proceedings; nature or type
of award; form, content, and time for issuing the arbitrator's award; and arbitrator's
fees. Dresser, supra note 8, at 555-60.
154. See, Norman 1. Zivin & Wendy E. Miller, An Overview of a Patent Law Suit
and the Decision to File, in Patent Litigation 1991, at 81, 82 (PLI/Pat Series No. 320,
1991).
155. PTC Research Foundation, supra note 9, at 278 (Question #6(d)). It is note-
worthy, however, that approximately 70% (35 out of 51 on the issue of validity, 37 out
of 51 on the issue of infringement and 36 out of 51 on the issue of damages) of the
survey respondents said they would agree to arbitrate patent disputes with claims of
less than $100,000. Id at 277-78. A recent survey indicated that corporations "over-
whelmingly favor arbitration for disputes involving smaller stakes, but only a very
small percentage prefer arbitration where the risks exceed six figures." William M.
Wesley & Donald A. Peterson, Patent Arbitration, 4 Alternative Disp. Res. Rep.
(BNA) No. 2, at 30 (Jan. 18, 1990).
156. See Zivin & Miller, supra note 154, at 82.
157. Brunda, supra note 8, at 76.
158. See supra note 133.
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Reluctance to arbitrate is often caused by worries about negotiating
leverage and posturing by the parties. Sometimes parties know that
the law or the facts are against them and would rather roll the dice
with a jury.' 59 Often the party who can most afford a protracted court
battle will see the threat of litigation as a means of coercing the other
side into a settlement.'" ° Others worry that by proposing arbitration
they will be perceived as having a weak case.' 6 1 This perception can
be overcome, however, by adopting a general corporate policy of
seeking arbitration in all disputes.' 62
The lack of full discovery in arbitration is another concern. Some
attorneys feel that full discovery is essential to patent infringement
litigation because it is often impossible to prove that infringement has
occurred without extensive discovery. 163 Uncontrolled discovery,
however, is inconsistent with goals of arbitration such as minimized
cost and time. 6" Rule 30 of the Patent Arbitration Rules provides for
limited discovery, 165 and arbitrators have the power to issue "pseudo-
subpoenas.' 1 66 These subpoenas can be used, for example, to secure
the testimony of the original inventor of the invention in question, to
force the disclosure of vital records necessary to prove infringement
or invalidity, or to obtain technical information pertaining to the in-
ventions at issue. Using this power, an arbitrator who is knowledgea-
ble in the field of the dispute and discusses discovery concerns with
the participants can ensure that sufficient discovery is accomplished
by both parties.
Some parties are reluctant to utilize arbitration to resolve patent
disputes because under the "Lear doctrine," 67 it appears that an arbi-
trator's findings of patent validity may not bind even the parties to the
159. See id.; Zivin & Miller, supra note 154, at 82. Some litigants also like to take a
chance with a jury in hopes of obtaining extremely large awards. See Brunda, supra
note 8, at 76. This perceived advantage of trying a patent case to a jury is somewhat
diminished following the Federal Circuit's recent landmark ruling in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). In Markman, the
Federal Circuit restricted the use of juries in patent cases to decide certain issues. Id.
at 970-71. Markman held that the issue of claim interpretation, determining the scope
and meaning of the individual claims of a patent, "is a matter of law exclusively for
the court." Id. This issue, often a central aspect of a patent infringement case, will
now be decided only by the judge. Id. Thus, both the jury's role and the perceived
advantage of having a jury are lessened.
160. Brunda, supra note 8, at 76.
161. Id. at 77.
162. Id.
163. See Zivin & Miller, supra note 154, at 100; Milgrim, supra note 124, § 4.6.3.
164. See Plant, supra note 12, at 227.
165. See, Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10, Rule 30, at 14; see also supra notes
116-120 and accompanying text.
166. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.03[4]. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that
"arbitrators... may summon in writing any person to attend before them... as a
witness and in a proper case to bring with... them any book, record, document, or
paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case." 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
167. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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arbitration, and those findings may be reargued in court."6 The "Lear
doctrine" holds that the public has a strong interest in the determina-
tion of the validity of patents, and that such determination is only
properly conducted by the federal courts. 169 In Lear, the Supreme
Court held that a licensee of a patent may challenge the validity of
that licensed patent in court, notwithstanding the licensing contract. 170
The Supreme Court indicated that this holding was required because
of the strong public interest in the patent as a monopoly. 17'
Several federal courts of appeals have further held that licensees
may reargue in court that patents are invalid after entering into con-
sent orders or dismissals with prejudice. 72 Similar contractual agree-
ments to arbitrate may be treated similarly. 73
The Federal Circuit has indicated, however, that it will not follow
this reasoning with respect to consent judgments including a statement
of validity of a patent 74 The Federal Circuit noted that:
The Supreme Court in Lear did not consider the policy concerns
evoked when preserving the finality of a judgment, but only the pol-
icies involved in resolving the right of a patent licensee to challenge
the validity of the licensed patent in a suit for royalties under the
contract....
The application of res judicata principles, thus, involves a public
policy totally absent from Lear 7 s
168. See Sol L. Goldstein, Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Patent Validity or In-
fringement, 72 IML B.J. 350, 353 (1984).
169. Lear, 395 U.S. at 663-64. The "Lear doctrine" only applies to questions of the
validity of a patent and not to other questions which may be resolved through arbitra-
tion such as infringement. See id. at 676.
170. Id. at 673-74.
171. Id. at 663-64. The Supreme Court noted that:
'It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed
by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention
should be protected in his monopoly .... '
... Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic
incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they
are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-
be monopolists without need or justification. Id. at 663-64,70 (quoting Pope
Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
172. See, e.g., Kraly v. National Distillers and Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1369
(7th Cir. 1974) ("We conclude that National Distillers, the licensee, is not estopped
from challenging the validity of the patent, even though a prior consent decree incor-
porated an understanding not to challenge the validity of the patent."); Massillon-
Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertising Co., 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971) ("We think the rationale of Lear requires us to
hold that the covenant of Golden State and Gold, in the settlement agreement of July
23, 1962, not to contest the validity of MCA's patent, is void on its face and
unenforceable.").
173. See Goldstein, supra note 168, at 353.
174. Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
175. Id. at 476.
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The public policy advocating strong enforcement of res judicata deci-
sions is more compelling than that associated with enforcing arbitra-
tion decisions. It is unclear, however, how the Federal Circuit will
rule on this issue with respect to arbitration. It is possible, given prior
rulings, that the Federal Circuit will hold that parties to an arbitration
may not relitigate the issue of patent validity.1 76
Some benefit may result, therefore, from forgoing arbitration and
having a patent reexamined in a federal court. If the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit sustains the patent as valid, it will then be
"respected by industry to a degree significantly beyond the respect
normally obtained by patents which have not yet been confirmed by a
court of appeals."' 77
This validation process, however, is quite lengthy and expensive. 178
While a finding by the Federal Circuit of patent validity is the most
secure type of judgment obtainable, its high cost is usually not justi-
fied. All patents, before being granted, go through a very rigorous
examination by the PTO.'7 9 Further, in an arbitration the arbitrator
will review and rule on the validity of the patent with the aid of infor-
mation provided by both sides of the dispute. The Federal Circuit is
unlikely to find a patent invalid after it had been issued by the PTO,8 °
and reinspected and approved by an experienced patent arbitrator.
This slight possibility does not justify the expense that would be in-
curred in relitigating the issue of patent validity up to the Federal
Circuit.
Another perceived problem with arbitration is that some patent at-
torneys believe that arbitrators have a tendency to "split the baby.'' s8
They believe that arbitrators will always compromise somewhat in
their rulings and that the parties will not receive a full measure of
justice."8 Coupled with this fear is the concern that if they receive a
judgment that they think is less than fair, their right to appeal is se-
verely restricted. 183
176. See Goldtsein, supra note 168, at 353.
177. Arnold, supra note 7, § 5.05.
178. See supra parts I.B.1 - B.2.
179. See Gould v. General Photonics Corp., 534 F. Supp. 399, 404 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
180. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
685 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990). Courts seldom reverse a finding of
patent validity because patents that have been issued by the PTO carry a presumption
of validity. See id. The plaintiff in a patent infringement case always has the burden of
proving infringement, but "this burden... does not, of course, in any way undermine
the presumed validity of [the plaintiff's] actual patent claims." Id
181. See William F. Heinze, Patent Mediation: The Forgotten Alternative in Dispute
Resolution, 18 Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n Q. 333, 339 & n.35 (1991); Bender, supra
note 38, at 10.
182. See Heinze, supra note 181, at 339.
183. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text; see also Plant, supra note 12, at
223 (arguing that parties to an arbitration must be willing to abide by a judgment from
which there is no substantive appeal); Milgrim, supra note 124, § 4.5.8 (noting limited
grounds of appeal); Beverly B. Goodwin & Laurence H. Pretty, How to Handle Liti-
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Notwithstanding these potential drawbacks, arbitration is still more
desirable than litigation in many situations. In addition to the de-
scribed advantages of cost,18a time,las quality,18 secrecy/privacy,1 7
preservation of commercial relationships, 188 and flexibility,' 9 plain-
tiffs also should want to arbitrate because, with arbitration, they will
receive any awards or damages in "real time." 190 Receiving a sum of
money five to fifteen years in the future, even if it is a greater amount,
is not as beneficial as receiving it within one year, guaranteed.191 The
money may be needed immediately to fund expansion or research or
possibly even to stave off bankruptcy. Defendants also should want to
arbitrate patent disputes because plaintiffs are more likely to accept
less money now than after a trial which may yield a huge jury
award.192
In sum, the stated advantages offered by arbitration outweigh the
limitations mentioned above. Arbitration is superior to litigation for
the resolution of many patent infringement disputes. Notwithstanding
this superiority, however, many attorneys and their clients are still
hesitant to utilize arbitration in patent disputes because of the lack of
conformity to rules of evidence in patent arbitrations.
III. A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: IMPLICATIONS OF THE LACK OF
EVIDENCE RuLEs IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
ARBITRATIONS
Rule 30 of the AAA Patent Arbitration Rules states that "conform-
ity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary." 193 At first blush,
gation of a Patent - Part 1, in How to Handle Basic Patent Problems, at 205, 206
(PLIJPat Series No. 343, 1992) (stating that "as a practical matter no appeal lies from
an arbitral award").
184. See supra part II.C.1.
185. See supra part II.C2.
186. See supra part II.C3.
187. See supra part II.C.4.
188. See supra part II.C.5.
189. See supra part II.C.6.
190. Borovoy, supra note 54, at 543.
191. See id. Of course, losing parties in arbitration, just like losing parties in court,
may not always pay the judgments they owe promptly. The beneficiary of an arbitra-
tion award, however, has simple recourse in the federal district courts to have the
arbitration award confirmed. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994). "A confirmation proceeding under
9 U.S.C. § 9 is intended to be summary: confirmation can only be denied if an award
has been corrected, vacated, or modified in accordance with the Federal Arbitration
Act." Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1986).
192. See Borovoy, supra note 54, at 543.
193. Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10, Rule 30, at 14; see also Hoteles Con-
dado Beach v. Union De Tronquistas, 763 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Arbitration
proceedings are not constrained by formal rules of procedure or evidence."). The
Center for Public Resources requires a minor limitation on evidence rules in arbitra-
tions through CPR Rule 11.2 which requires that "the [arbitration] tribunal shall ap-
ply the lawyer-client privilege and the work product immunity." CPR Rule 11.2(1988).
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this provision does not appear to be controversial. After all, it con-
forms to the concept of arbitration as a more relaxed, more flexible,
and more open forum than litigation. 94 While rules of evidence
"keep out unreliable, irresponsible evidence,' 1 95 conformity to formal
rules of evidence "keep[s] out much inexpensive evidence of a type we
all rely upon in day to day business," and explains events that "either
no evidence or evidence very expensive to come by or introduce
[can]."'196 While some may be enticed by the prospect of discarding
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the lack of evidence rules in arbitra-
tion deters many parties from arbitrating patent infringement cases.
A. Advantages of a Lack of Rules of Evidence
Several clear, undeniable advantages result from the absence of for-
mal evidence rules in patent infringement arbitrations. The first bene-
fit involves the qualifications of the arbitrators. One commentator
notes that if formal rules of evidence are implemented in arbitration
proceedings, one of the arbitrators must be a former judge or exper-
ienced litigator.197 This argument is based on the notion that an arbi-
trator without such experience would be unable to make correct
evidentiary rulings based on the law. Thus, if no evidence rules are
utilized in the arbitration, the potential pool of arbitrators to choose
from is larger. Additionally, such an experienced arbitrator is sure to
demand a larger fee due to the scarcity of qualified individuals, and
this will cut away at the cost savings of arbitration.
The greatest advantages of the lack of evidence rules, however, are
realized in the admission of technological evidence such as computer-
generated reports, exhibits, and other documents. 98 It is quite expen-
sive and time-consuming to determine if this type of evidence, com-
mon to cases involving high-technology and patents, is admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.199 Because it is expensive and
sometimes impossible to place this evidence into admissible form, the
lack of formal evidence rules operates as a cost saver.2 °°
194. See supra part II.B - C.
195. Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.18.
196. lM.
197. See Clark & Fenwick, supra note 51, at 25. Non-attorneys can serve as arbitra-
tors, however, even if rules of evidence are used provided that the arbitrators receive
adequate training in applying rules of evidence. See infra p. 128 (discussing requiring
arbitrators to complete basic training in application of rules of evidence before arbi-
trating patent cases).
198. See id.
199. Id; see infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
200. See Clark & Fenwick, supra note 51, at 25. For example, any technical docu-
ment that is proposed to be admitted under formal evidence rules must first be au-
thenticated and explained by an expert witness at great expense to the party seeking
to introduce the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 901. Rule 901 states that "authentication" is
"a condition precedent to admissibility" and "is satisfied by evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims." Id.
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B. Disadvantages of a Lack of Rules of Evidence
As alluded to earlier, the lack of rules of evidence cuts two ways.
While some factors favor dispensing with all rules of evidence, such a
decision would slice away at the reliability and quality of arbitration.
Without conformity to evidence rules, uncertainty and unpredict-
ability abound as to what will be admissible."' In some cases, not all
of the evidence will be admitted or considered,2° while in others, im-
material or prejudicial evidence, or both, will influence the out-
come.203 Affidavits that have not been cross-examined, for example,
are particularly unreliable and are often admitted in arbitrations.2°
Without evidence rules, false affidavits or other unreliable evidence
might erroneously be relied upon by an arbitrator.0 5 Vesting an arbi-
trator with nearly complete discretion and little accountability2°6 can
easily cause the parties to lose control of the proceedings and suffer
unpredictable results.
Another general problem is that without predetermined evidence
rules, the two parties could come to the hearing with vastly different
expectations as to what evidence will be allowed.2°7 These different
expectations could quickly lead to strife between the participants, thus
canceling one of the benefits of arbitration-maintaining good rela-
tions between the parties.208 Other surprises may occur if one side
appears at the arbitration bearing evidence on new issues, raising new
defenses, or even seeking new remedies. 0
An absence of evidence rules in patent cases also can lead to "an
expensive [evidentiary] free-for-all. ' '210 The two parties may engage
in a "battle of experts"-a war of attrition in which each party
presents an excessive number of expert witnesses in an effort to
counter those called by the other.211 This battle claims as its victims
201. See id.; Arnold, supra note 4, at 685.
202. See Plant, supra note 12, at 226.
203. See Arnold, supra note 13, at 733.
204. Arnold, supra note 13, at 733. One commentator has postulated that the aver-
age uncross-examined affidavit contains at least "one falsehood for every page or
three" and "not infrequently a falsehood per paragraph." Id. at 734.
205. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.18.
206. See Goodwin & Pretty, supra note 183, at 207.
207. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.18.
208. See iU; supra part lI.C.5.
209. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.18. This problem of surprise is usually avoided in
litigation by careful judicial supervision of the discovery process under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123
F.R.D. 603, 606 (D. Minn. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43,48 (E.D.
Ky. 1988); Bobby M. Harges, The Promise of the Mandatory Swmary Jury Trial, 63
Temp. L. Rev. 799, 808-09 (1990). Since discovery is severely curtailed with arbitra-
tion, the problem must be addressed through other measures. See infra note 241 and
accompanying text.
210. Plant, supra note 12, at 242.
211. See Peter J. Scavello & Carol Leva, Effective Use of Technical Experts, in PLI
Continuing Legal Assistant Training (R) Workshops For Legal Assistants 1994: Basic
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nearly all of the advantages of arbitration, including savings in cost,
time, and quality.212 With the possibility of this result present in arbi-
trations, the parties might well choose to engage in full-blown
litigation.
Finally, a lack of conformity to rules of evidence opens the doors of
the arbitration to the testimony of "junk scientists." These witnesses
testify on theories that are neither recognized widely within their field
nor scientifically founded. Junk scientists are said to "discard enough
'bad' data to make the remaining 'good' points look important....
Professional statisticians call this 'data dredging.' ,,213 Junk scientists
of this sort generally are unreliable, and may sway an arbitrator. They
have "much of the same form but none of the.., substance" of true
scientists. 214 Commentators have noted that jurors are often swayed
by junk scientists.21 5 This is because "true expert[s] will assert [their]
scientific conclusions cautiously, while the 'junk scientist' will confi-
dently articulate the truth of scientifically dubious propositions. 21 6
While generally less impressionable than jurors, there remains the
chance that arbitrators could be similarly swayed by junk scientists. In
any arbitration, the most preferable situation is for the arbitrator to be
an expert in the exact technical field of the dispute.2 a7 In many situa-
tions, however, this is not possible. There are only a limited number
of experts in any particular technical field, and even fewer who have
the legal training necessary to be arbitrators under the system pro-
Litigation, Legal Research And Writing, at 329, 332 (PLIILit Series No. 501, 1994)("[O]pposing attorneys attempt at trial to inundate the jury with the most respected,
most qualified, or most numerous expert witnesses to bolster their positions.").
Under the AAA Patent Arbitration Rules, an arbitrator has some power to limit
the amount of discovery that takes place. Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10,
Rules 30-31, at 14. The arbitrator is obligated, however, to "afford a full and equal
opportunity to all parties for the presentation of any material and relevant evidence."
Id., Rule 28, at 13. Under these constraints it is unclear how much an arbitrator could
permissibly limit the presentation of relevant, yet excessive, evidence.
212. The presence of an expert in the field of the dispute as one of the arbitrators
can somewhat mitigate the probability of entrance into such a battle. See Bender,
supra note 38, at 12. First, the attorneys will feel less of a need to present as much
expert testimony with the knowledge that the arbitrator is already quite knowledgea-
ble in the area. Id. Second, the experts that do testify may take less extreme, and
possibly less deceiving, positions because they know that they are dealing with a fact-
finder that is experienced in the field. Id.
213. Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 27 (1991).
214. Id. at 2.
215. Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Sci-
entific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity",
25 Conn. L. Rev. 1083, 1091 (1993).
A National Law Journal survey reported that, in civil trials, 36% of those polled
said that expert testimony "made a great deal of difference," 32% said it "made some
difference," 16% said it "did not make much difference," and 13% said it "had no
impact" on the outcome of the trial. Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S4.
216. Jacobs, supra note 215, at 1091.
217. See supra notes 133-35.
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posed by this Note.218 Often, arbitrators will have a general techni-
cal background but lack training in the precise field of the dispute." 9
Thus, the arbitrator may still be susceptible to confusion by skilled
junk scientists. Without rules of evidence, it is difficult to prevent
junk scientists' testimony from possibly influencing the outcome of the
arbitration.
IV. A PROPOSAL: MODIFIED USE OF' THE FEDERAL RuL-s OF
EVIDENCE IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT ARBITRATIONS
Given the problems presented by a complete lack of evidentiary
rules, and the potential benefits of arbitration, another solution must
be found. Some commentators suggest that conformity to rules of
evidence, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence, may benefit arbitra-
tion.1 0 Use of the Federal Rules in their standard form, however,
cancels many of the benefits of arbitration discussed above.221 Thus,
this Note contends that a hybrid approach, using the Federal Rules of
Evidence as a starting point, should be utilized in all patent infringe-
ment arbitrations. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide an excel-
lent baseline because they are widely used, well understood, and
generally successful in protecting the integrity of evidence. The Fed-
eral Rules preserve basic reliability and predictability of evidence,
preclude immaterial and prejudicial evidence, minimize the possibility
of surprise evidence, issues, defenses, or remedies, prevent the occur-
rence of a "battle of experts," and exclude the testimony of "junk
scientists. ' ' 2
Use of rules of evidence in arbitration, however, requires the arbi-
trator to be skilled in applying rules of evidence which could reduce
the pool of available arbitratorsm There are two ways to overcome
this potential shortcoming. First, three-person panels may be used in
218. This Note proposes that a modified form of the Federal Rules of Evidence
should be utilized in all patent arbitrations. See infra part IV.
219. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Tom Arnold, Suggested Form of Contract to Arbitrate a Parent or
Other Commercial Dispute, Annotated, C976 ALI-ABA 229, 249 (1994) [hereinafter
Suggested Form of Contract to Arbitrate] (including use of Federal Rules of Evidence
in proposed agreement to arbitrate); Tom Arnold, Contracts to Arbitrate Patent and
Other Commercial Disputes, 10 Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 191, 194 (1992) (not-
ing that the adoption of evidence rules is an important consideration for the parties to
an arbitration of a patent dispute); Plant, supra note 12, at 241-42 (suggesting that
conformity to rules of evidence such as the Federal Rules of Evidence, along with
tight control by the arbitrator may prevent the arbitration hearing from becoming an
"expensive free-for-all").
221. See supra part lI.B; Arnold, Suggested Form of Contract to Arbtitrate, supra
note 220, at 249 n.62 ("[Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence] will sacrifice great
amounts of the savings in time and money that arbitration potentially affords.").
222. See Clark & Fenwick, supra note 51, at 25; see also supra part IILB.
223. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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the arbitration.2 4 In this manner it may be easier to construct a panel
of which one arbitrator has expertise in the exact technical area of the
dispute while one of the other arbitrators has the legal expertise re-
quired to conduct the hearing, especially ruling on evidentiary mat-
ters. The use of three person arbitration panels does, of course,
increase the cost of the arbitration proceedings.225
A second, possibly superior, option is to require all arbitrators to
know or learn basic rules of federal evidence practice sufficient to
conduct an arbitration hearing under this proposal. Attorneys will al-
ready possess this knowledge. Non-attorneys, however, should be re-
quired to complete basic training in the Federal Rules of Evidence in
order to serve as arbitrators of patent cases. This training does not
need to be overly burdensome and can be justified by the substantial
fees patent arbitrators can demand. 6
As mentioned above, several changes must be made to the basic
structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to preserve the
advantages of arbitration over litigation. First, reports from experts
expected to testify at the arbitration hearing must be submitted to the
arbitrator, preferably prior to the date of the arbitration hearing. Sec-
ond, parties must be permitted, perhaps even required, to submit sum-
maries of testimony to be offered, and these summaries should be
entered into evidence in lieu of reading in depositions. Finally, the
hearsay rules must be relaxed to allow some evidence such as reports,
documents, and some testimony, to be admitted without following all
of the costly procedures for authenticating such items.
These proposed changes should be included in all arbitration agree-
ments and also incorporated into the AAA Patent Arbitration
Rules.227 It is important for the AAA to adopt these changes because
parties often turn to these rules when trying to arbitrate an existing
dispute to which there is no prior agreement regarding arbitration.228
224. See supra note 109. Three-person arbitration panels may have other advan-
tages as well such as making it easier to balance the expertise required for the case.
See Arnold, supra note 13, at 711. Arnold, for example, suggests that a panel for a
patent arbitration case could be composed of a chemist, a businessperson, and a pat-
ent lawyer. Id. Another potential benefit of having a three-person panel of arbitra-
tors is that the quality of the judgment may be higher "due to the debates and
interactions between the arbitrators." Id. at 712.
225. Id. This increase in cost results not only from paying three arbitrators instead
of one. It also arises from scheduling difficulties and increased editing requirements
of each arbitrators' written work by the other two arbitrators. Id. This increase in
cost, however, should not be significant enough to destroy the cost savings realized by
arbitration over litigation.
226. Arbitrators of patent disputes set their own fees which are recorded and pub-
lished by the AAA prior to the parties choosing the arbitrators for their dispute.
These fees typically are between $500 and $1000 per day of work on the case but can
be as high as $1500 per day. Telephone Interview with American Arbitration Associ-
ation, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 11, 1995).
227. See supra note 100.
228. See Dresser, supra note 8, at 553.
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These rules are the most effective solution because they are generally
viewed as neutral and have a known interpretation; thus, parties are
more likely to be swayed to accept arbitration of their patent dispute
if the Federal Rules of Evidence apply, albeit in modified form.
A. Submission of Experts' Reports and Summaries of Testimony
Experts' reports often are critical in cases involving technology-re-
lated issues.230 Both sides of a patent infringement dispute commonly
present expert reports to prove distinctions and similarities between
the accused infringer's invention and the patent owner's invention,
and to illustrate the process by which the accused infringer's invention
was developed. 3 1 The parties should submit these reports to the arbi-
trator in advance of the arbitration hearing date so that the arbitrator
may review them before the hearing.23
The parties to an arbitration also should submit brief written sum-
maries of all of the testimony and evidence they plan to present.
These summaries need only be two to three pages long, but must fully
and accurately describe the testimony they represent. Both the attor-
neys and witnesses must declare that the report is accurate to the best
of their knowledge.1 3 These summaries will be entered into evidence
and used in the final adjudicationprocess, subject to cross-examina-
tion requirements outlined below.
There are several advantages to this process. First, by presubmit-
ting all of the experts' reports, arbitrators can familiarize themselves
229. See id.
230. See Clark & Fenwick, supra note 51, at 25.
231. See Goodwin & Pretty, supra note 183, at 225 (discussing the various roles of
technical experts in patent disputes).
232. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text. An appropriate time for these
submissions may be at the Administrative Conference and Preliminary Hearing re-
quired by the AAA Patent Arbitration Rules. Patent Arbitration Rules, supra note 10,
Rule 9, at 7-8.
233. This rule is analogous to the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), which
states in pertinent part:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or un-
represented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances,- (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
234. A process somewhat similar to this, used in commercial arbitrations, has been
referred to as the "witness-statement format." Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.18. It has
been estimated that "more than half of all direct evidence in commercial arbitrations
is now presented in affidavit form of witness statements." Id. Summaries of antici-
pated witness testimony are also utilized in lieu of live testimony in summary jury
trials. See Lucille M. Ponte, Putting Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Back on the
Docket: Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial Authority, 63 Fordham L Rev.
1069, 1076-77 (1995).
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with the reports prior to the arbitration hearing.z35 Presubmission will
minimize the "learning curve" time of resolution, and will help to
lower the costs of the arbitration.236 Because the arbitrator already
will have been presented with the relevant information and will not
need to hear an attorney lead the experts through an oral discussion
of their testimony at the arbitration hearing, the extent of the direct
oral testimony will be greatly decreased or even eliminated.237 The
submission of summaries of other non-expert witnesses' testimony will
have similar effects.
Using this approach, all parties involved in the arbitration will save
both time and money. Shorter testimony by all witnesses will de-
crease the length of the arbitration hearing, cutting down on attorney
and arbitrator costs. The compensation paid to experts will also be
reduced because they will spend less time testifying at the hearing.
Questions remain, however, as to the reliability of testimony
presented in this form. To maintain the integrity, accuracy, and qual-
ity of the proceedings, all witnesses must be subject to cross-examina-
tion by opposing counsel. The opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
will help to ensure that the testimony provided through experts' re-
ports and summaries of testimony will be as accurate and truthful as if
it had been given at the arbitration hearing as direct oral testimony.2 38
For complete fairness, the party presenting the witness also must have
the opportunity to redirect the examination of the witness.
Use of this process also will result in increased quality of judgment.
In most cases, the experts' reports and summaries of testimony pro-
vided to the arbitrators will be more intelligible than several hours of
direct oral testimony. In an affidavit, witnesses may highlight and
thoughtfully explain key points and ideas, upon reflection, instead of
while bounded by the impatient and awkward process of eliciting evi-
dence through interrogatories. Further, the arbitrator will have had
an opportunity to form questions for the witness to further challenge
the competency of the testimony.239 Thus, not only is this process
faster and less costly, but it can also be more accurate.
This method also can alleviate some of the need for discovery.240 If
the opposing party is provided with all of the experts' reports, and
235. See Clark & Fenwick, supra note 51, at 25.
236. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
237. Due process with respect to each of the witnesses will still be maintained with
this approach as the opposing party will still have the opportunity to fully cross-ex-
amine each witness presented during the arbitration.
238. See Arnold, supra note 7, § 7.18 (stating "the preservation of the right of cross-
examination [of witnesses who have provided affidavit testimony] provides relative
reliability and induces candor in the original statements.")
239. Arbitrators are allowed and encouraged to question witnesses directly to more
fully understand their testimony. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
240. See Brunda, supra note 8, at 82.
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summaries of testimony from all of the witnesses, they have less need
for discovery. This process, too, saves cost and time.
A final benefit of this process is that, by requiring each side to dis-
close the content of their evidence before the hearing, the risk of sur-
prise issues or defenses being raised is minimized' 41 The problem of
surprise is unique to arbitration as the lengthy discovery process asso-
ciated with standard patent litigation is intended to remove the risk of
surprise of this nature. 42 This problem of surprise is more likely to
occur with each relaxation of the rules of evidence and procedure.
With no rules forbidding such actions, surprise of this nature probably
will occur. The mandatory pre-hearing submission of evidence and
testimony advocated by this Note eases this problem and restores ar-
bitration to a comparable position to litigation on this matter.
B. Admission of Certain Forms of Hearsay Evidence
The final adaptation that must be made to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence when used in patent infringement arbitrations involves a relaxa-
tion of the rules regarding hearsay. The Federal Rules of Evidence
define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." 43 Statements that are hearsay may not
be admitted under the Federal Rules unless they qualify under one of
the exceptions to the hearsay rules provided by Rules 803 and 804, or
are not hearsay by definition under Rule 801(d)."
Hearsay evidence is often sought to be used in patent cases to prove
a variety of aspects of both parties' arguments. These uses include:
proving when and where the allegedly infringing invention was made,
used, or sold; proving circumstances surrounding the original prosecu-
tion of the patented invention; and also proving important facts rele-
vant to the prior art. This hearsay testimony can range from
unauthenticated, or unable to be authenticated documents, to oral or
written testimony by witnesses of acts or occurrences.
Documents procured from the opposing party by way of discovery
or disclosure are a common source of evidence that is often very diffi-
cult to be authenticated. These documents are especially important in
patent infringement cases because, without them, parties are often un-
able to prove all aspects of their claims2 45 Without help from the
opposing party, it is sometimes impossible for the party wishing to
241. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
242. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any mat-
ter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to
the claim of defense or any other party. . .
243. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
244. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d), 802-04.
245. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
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introduce the evidence to satisfy the hearsay exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence.246 The specific problem is the difficulty of proving
the document was recorded "in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and... [that] it was the regular practice of that busi-
ness activity to make" such report.247
While the party wishing to offer these documents may be unable to
prove their admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, such
documents may be of highly probative value. Examples of such docu-
ments include records of scientific activities, results of tests per-
formed, and timetables of production of the invention in question.2 48
All of these may prove dispositive in determining the validity of a
patent or determining whether an infringement has occurred. With-
out some kind of special exception, however, the arbitrator will not be
able to use this evidence in making a ruling.
Because this evidence is often of questionable reliability, this Note
proposes that it should be admitted only if certain safeguards are in
place. Hearsay testimony not admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence must be corroborated; otherwise, it should not be consid-
ered by the arbitrator. 49 Under the system advocated by this Note,
this corroboration may be shown through circumstances indicated by
other evidence or other non-hearsay testimony that supports the cred-
ibility of the proffered hearsay testimony. By this process, more relia-
ble evidence will be considered by the arbitrator without as much
prejudicial evidence clouding the decision.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration is clearly superior to litigation for the resolution of most
patent infringement disputes. Arbitration is less costly, less time con-
suming, of higher quality, more private, and more flexible. Plaintiffs
and defendants, patent holders and accused patent infringers, all have
reasons to prefer arbitration. Nonetheless, many patent attorneys and
their clients remain hesitant to fully exploit the advantages of arbitra-
246. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) ("Records of regularly conducted activity"); Fed. R.
Evid. 803(7) ("Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6)").
247. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). These documents also often do not satisfy the require-
ments of Rule 902(9) providing for self-authentication of commercial paper and re-
lated documents. Fed. R. Evid. 902(9). This is because these documents are often
unsigned and unattributable and are, therefore, not within the scope of accepted doc-
uments under "general commercial law." Id. They are also usually not admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2) as admissions by a party-opponent, again because they are usu-
ally unsigned and unattributable to anyone. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
248. See Clark & Fenwick, supra note 51, at 25.
249. It is assumed that an arbitrator, like a judge ruling on the admissibility of evi-
dence in a trial, is able to consciously disregard evidence that is ultimately declared
inadmissible, and not be influenced by it when rendering a decision.
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tion. ° The greatest of these parties' fears involves the complete lack
of rules of evidence currently applicable to patent arbitrations.
To encourage more parties to patent disputes to take advantage of
arbitration, a modified version of the Federal Rules of Evidence must
be employed. Under this system, the advantages of arbitration are
preserved without sacrificing the admission of useful, probative evi-
dence, while still excluding unreliable, irresponsible evidence. This
system requires the use either of three-person arbitration panels or
that all arbitrators be trained in application of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Further benefits of decreased cost and time, increased
quality of resolution, secrecy and flexibility, and preservation of com-
mercial relationships will result from the presubmission of experts' re-
ports to arbitrators. Thus, through these reforms, an appropriate
balance is achieved, and patent attorneys and their clients can enter
arbitration more assured that the final outcome will be both just and
fair.
250. See PTC Research Foundation, supra note 9, at 275.
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